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Abstract  
We study the impact of unjust inequality on social trust and trustworthiness, and its sepa-
rate effect on the economically successful and the unsuccessful, in a controlled economic 
experiment. We find evidence for a negative effect of unfair economic inequality on so-
cial interactions. Probing the boundaries of this effect, we document that this erosion of 
social capital critically depends on the context: if a well-off person is not directly respon-
sible for the outcome of the worse-off person, then we observe no negative effects on 
trust and trustworthiness in the aggregate. Moreover, our data do not support the view 
that higher status or wealth leads to an erosion of pro-social attitudes: the successful are 
always more generous; groups of unsuccessful persons are least efficient and least gener-
ous in the trust game.   
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1. Introduction 
The recent surge of income and wealth inequality in many developed countries is a wide-
ly discussed topic in the media and academic research. Much of these discussions revolve 
around the gains of the top-income decile and the stagnation of income for the bottom 
half of the distribution and its implications for society (e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2003; Au-
tor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008; Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2014; Piketty, Saez and 
Zucman, 2016; World Inequality Report, Alvaredo et al., 2017). Indeed, inequality deriv-
ing from competitive economic environments is often associated with negative societal 
consequences (Stiglitz, 2012; Verhaeghe, 2014). In particular, it is sometimes conjectured 
that inequality may harm the social fabric, destroying social capital (trust, honesty, coop-
eration) and subsequently affecting economic outcomes (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). 
Two hypotheses can be derived from the literature in economics and the social sciences. 
The first hypothesis states that higher inequality, especially if perceived as unjust and 
caused by competition, hampers economic interaction (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Bé-
nabou, 1996; IPSP, 2017, Section 3; Camera, Deck and Porter, 2017). The second hy-
pothesis states that those who are in an advantageous position (of higher status or wealth) 
in an unequal society, become self-focused and greedy (Piff et al., 2010; 2012; Fisman et 
al., 2015, Guinote et al., 2015; Nishi et al., 2015). That is, negative social consequences 
are caused by the behavior of the successful.  
 Both of these hypotheses are contested in the literature. However, empirical assess-
ments of the effects of inequality and the role of the successful often suffer from an ab-
sence of counterfactuals and the endogeneity of status. Experimental methods offer an 
alternative approach for assessing the consequences of inequality as they make exoge-
nous variation of inequality, the underlying causes of inequality, institutions and availa-
ble information possible (e.g., Falk and Heckman, 2009; Charness and Fehr, 2015). 
While potentially having lower external validity, experiments thus provide a clear identi-
fication of causal effects and underlying processes.   
 This paper uses experimental methods to study the impact of unjust inequality on 
subsequent social interactions, differentiating between the behavior of the economically 
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successful and the unsuccessful. Our design thus aims to test both hypotheses within the 
same setting. We create income inequality in dyads, using a real-effort procedure with 
varying payment schemes. Subsequently, we let these dyads interact in a modified trust 
game allowing us to measure both players’ social trust and trustworthiness. Social trust 
has been interpreted as an important component of social capital in the literature (Glaeser 
et al., 2000; Bellemare and Kröger, 2007; Björnskov, 2017; Langer et al., 2017). As 
higher social capital is typically associated with better-functioning institutions and socie-
ty in general (Putnam, 2000), social trust is a center piece in the debate on whether ine-
quality erodes the social fabric.1 In addition, our experimental measure for trustworthi-
ness allows us to quantify subjects’ greed or altruism absent strategic motives. It directly 
tests the hypothesis that higher inequality has a negative impact on social interactions 
because successful people become less generous, in particular less generous than the un-
successful.  
 We create exogenous variation in income inequality in the real-effort task by ran-
domly assigning subjects to two different payment schemes. In our baseline condition 
subjects receive a piece-rate payment. This results in relatively low inequality and is typi-
cally not perceived as unjust. We compare the trust-game outcomes in this setting with an 
unjust high-inequality environment. To generate high inequality, we implement a rela-
tive-payment scheme that gives an undue advantage to one participant in the dyad.2 This 
undermines equality of opportunity and the payment scheme can thus be seen as unfair 
from a normative perspective (e.g., Roemer, 1998). In a third condition, we employ the 
                                                 
1 More precisely, social capital can be defined as values and shared beliefs that help groups to cooperate in 
situations where contracts are difficult or impossible to enforce (cp., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2010). 
According to this definition it is possible to measure social capital by eliciting values and beliefs with ex-
perimental tools such as the trust game (see e.g., Fehr (2009) for an extensive account of the measurement 
of trust and trust beliefs). In the economic literature social capital has been positively associated with a 
plethora of economic outcomes, such as economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997), the size of firms 
(e.g., Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012) or financial development (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2004).  
2 There is evidence documenting that (high) inequality is not per se seen as unfair (e.g., Bortolotti et al., 
2017; Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani, 2018; Fehr, 2018). For example, Fehr (2018) illustrates that an in-
crease in inequality leads to more antisocial behavior but only if higher inequality cannot be clearly at-
tributed to work effort and is possibly the result of immoral behavior. 
4 
 
same relative-payment scheme to generate unjust inequality as before, but randomly re-
match participants in the trust-game stage (keeping earnings information constant across 
conditions). This eliminates the direct responsibility for each other’s outcomes in the dy-
ads and has the advantage of observing matches with equal and unequal outcomes.  
 Our results support the view that unjust inequality can negatively affect social inter-
actions. That is, we document a significant decline in trust and trustworthiness when in-
come inequality is the result of an income-generating process that is eminently perceived 
as unfair. However, we also find that this observed decline depends on a direct interaction 
in the first stage, i.e., when the well-off (“successful”) player causing the poor outcome 
of the worse-off (“unsuccessful”) player. If we take away the direct interaction by re-
matching participants in the trust game, we find that especially the successful players 
maintain a high level of trust and trustworthiness, in particular when interacting among 
themselves. That is, the detrimental impact of inequality on social interactions critically 
depends on contextual factors.  
 We do not find evidence that the advantageous social position makes people more 
selfish: successful players are consistently more generous than the unsuccessful in abso-
lute terms. However, holding the successful accountable to higher normative standards 
(such as sharing the trust-game pie equally), or evaluating generosity in terms of giving 
relative to someone’s wealth position, we may well argue that they fall short on these 
standards.   
 In the next section, we introduce the experimental paradigm and design of our study 
followed by a description of how we induce unjust inequality. Section 3 shows that our 
experimental paradigm successfully induces inequality differences and a polarization of 
fairness perceptions. Clearly, neither inequality nor competitiveness have to be perceived 
negatively per se (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2007; Cappelen et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 
2014; Bartling et al., 2017, Bartling, Grieder, and Zehnder, 2017). Rather, it is the com-
bination of inequality and unequal opportunity within a competitive environment that 
aims to trigger strong feelings of injustice in our experimental setup. While pooling these 
features hides their marginal contribution to the perception of unfairness, it guarantees a 
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powerful prime to reliably quantify the effects of unjust inequality on social interactions 
and, arguably, mirrors many settings outside the laboratory. 3 Competition, unequal op-
portunities, and inequality are inherent features of school education, universities, work-
places or labor markets more generally.4 Section 4 discusses the effects of unjust inequal-
ity in fixed dyads and Section 5 discusses the effects when direct attributions of responsi-
bility for others’ outcomes cannot be made. We discuss these results in the context of the 
related literature in section 6.   
 
2. Experimental Paradigm and Design 
The current study employs an experimental paradigm in which dyads of participants in-
teract in two stages. In the first stage, a repeated real-effort task involves either an indi-
vidual piece-rate payment, or a competitive tournament with a favorable condition for the 
initial tournament winner (in a between-subjects design). While the piece-rate condition 
leads to modest inequality depending on individual performance, the tournaments ampli-
fy income differences in a way that is difficult to justify by the observed performance 
differences. In the second stage these same dyads then interact in a trust game. Conse-
quently, we observe trust and trustworthiness depending on stage-1 conditions, and de-
pending on stage-1 income. In a third treatment, the tournament-based real-effort stage is 
followed by a trust-game stage involving new matches of dyads, which have, however, 
exactly the same degree of information on each other’s earnings as dyads in the fixed-pair 
tournament condition.  
                                                 
3 Note that our paradigm can be extended to identify the marginal impact of the different features of the 
environment.  However, the effects may not be additive making it impossible to disentangle them. See 
section 2.1 for a more thorough discussion of this issue. 
4 For example, Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) document an economy-wide increase of perfor-
mance-pay jobs in the U.S. labor market, along with a substantial increase in wage inequality. Features of 
competitive environments are innately linked to relative status concerns or relative-income comparisons, 
and it is long known that individuals care about their standing relative to others (e.g., Veblen, 1899). Sever-
al recent experimental studies suggest that such comparisons have, for example, detrimental effects on 
well-being (Card et al., 2012) or ethical behavior (e.g., Gill, Prowse and Vlassopoulos, 2013; John, Loe-
wenstein and Rick, 2014).  
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 In the following, we first describe the stage-1 income manipulation, and the elicita-
tion of fairness judgments. We then provide details on the trust game stage with fixed 
dyads, and new dyads. Our three treatments are called Piece Rate (first-stage piece rate – 
fixed dyads); Tournament (first-stage tournament – fixed dyads); and Tournament-New 
(first-stage tournament – new partner in stage 2).       
 
2.1. Stage 1: Inequality Manipulation  
We implement a repeated real-effort slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2012) and vary the 
payment scheme to manipulate inequality, i.e., low inequality versus high and potentially 
unjust inequality. In the slider task, participants see a number of sliders on their computer 
screen and have to adjust each slider to exactly the middle position within a certain time 
limit (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). The goal in this task is to maximize the number of 
correctly positioned sliders before the allotted time runs out. Participants are only al-
lowed to use their mouse to drag the sliders into the correct position.5 The task requires 
little a-priori knowledge and skills such that outcomes mainly depend on the expended 
effort of subjects. Unfairness or concerns about unequal opportunities arise only through 
institutional features, i.e., the details of the implemented payment scheme. 
 In the low-inequality condition (Piece Rate), participants complete four rounds of 
this task, each lasting for 120 seconds. In each round, they receive a flat payment of 
€0.50 plus €0.05 per correctly placed slider. Total earnings are calculated by summing up 
the earnings in the four rounds. Note that each subject in a dyad individually determines 
her own earnings, i.e., there is no interaction. However, at the end of each round both 
subjects in the dyad are informed about the correctly positioned sliders and the resulting 
earnings of each other. Thus, social comparison is also salient in this setting. 
 In the high-inequality conditions (Tournament and Tournament-New), participants in 
a dyad also complete the slider task four times. In contrast to the Piece Rate condition, 
                                                 
5 To avoid cheating, we used a keyboard locker to prevent students from using the arrow keys or the mouse 
wheel. 
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participants’ payoffs in each round are determined through a relative performance 
scheme. That is, the subject with the higher number of correctly placed sliders in a round 
receives €3.00, while the subject with the lower number of correctly placed sliders re-
ceives €0.30. In the case of equal performance, the two payments are randomly allocated. 
As in Piece Rate, participants receive information on the performance of each subject and 
the resulting payoffs after each round.   
 In addition to the high payoff, the subject with the higher performance receives a 
time bonus. More specifically, after an initial time budget of 120 second for both sub-
jects, the winner of the first round obtains a time bonus of 8 seconds, and the winners of 
the second and third round get a time bonus of 6 and 4 seconds, respectively. The time 
bonus is subtracted from the time budget of the tournament loser in the respective round.  
 Tournament incentives are ubiquitous in economic life, and typically lead to a more 
spread pay distribution (and thus more inequality) than the underlying effort and ability 
justifies (Frank and Cook, 1995). We mimic this observation in our setup with a large 
difference in tournament prizes for winners and losers that hardly warrants the observed 
effort differences within dyads in a given round. This income difference magnifies over 
the rounds because of the substantial time gap (16 seconds) that arises after the first 
round and that makes it nearly impossible for the first-round loser to catch up in the sub-
sequent rounds.6 The condition thus induces inequality, caused by a competitive proce-
dure that is difficult to justify on fairness grounds. In addition, this feature allows subjects 
to grow into their favorable or unfavorable economic positions over the course of the 
three remaining real-effort task rounds. This seems important in view of the conjecture 
that the successful are responsible for the erosion of the societal cooperation (e.g., Piff et 
al., 2010, 2012; Piff, 2013). For example, Piff (2013) observes that rich players in a 
rigged Monopoly Game experiment favoring their own economic status become increas-
ingly imperious as inequality gets larger.  
                                                 
6 Note that winning the first round depends on exerted effort and to a large degree on matching luck (i.e., 
the random assignment of the interaction partner). 
8 
 
 Note that our Tournament design includes two components – competition and unjust 
procedure – that are absent in the Piece Rate condition and additionally results in higher 
income inequality than the Piece Rate condition. These three aspects arguably go often 
hand in hand in real-world settings, where initial advantages are amplified in competitive 
contexts, leading to enhanced inequality (e.g., Frank and Cook, 1995; Stiglitz, 2012). For 
example, if performance in or quality of primary school determines access to better sec-
ondary schools and subsequently to college, students end up with better jobs and higher 
earnings (see e.g., Chetty et al., 2011). At the same time, combining these three aspects 
provides a powerful instrument to probe the effects of (unjust) income inequality on so-
cial interactions. This is important as previous evidence suggests that inequality effects 
are subtle (see discussion in Section 6). As such, our focus is on maximizing the impact 
of inequality in the Tournament conditions in comparison to the inequality in the Piece 
Rate condition, and not on fully differentiating the marginal effects of the three ingredi-
ents (higher inequality, competition, unjust procedure).  
 
2.2 Stage 1: Measurement of Fairness Perception  
We measure subjects’ fairness evaluations of the payment schemes to assess whether the 
piece rate versus tournament manipulation was successful in creating perceptions of un-
fair inequality. To gauge the impact of the procedures on participants, we measure fair-
ness perceptions both before and after the stage-1 game. At the beginning of the experi-
ment, participants receive the detailed instructions about the stage-1 real-effort task and 
the payment procedures of their condition. They then answer three control questions 
about the procedure. Next, they are asked to indicate on a scale from 0 (very unfair) to 10 
(very fair) how fair they consider the payment procedures in stage 1. They also indicate 
their gender, age, and field of study. After that they start with the real-effort task.  
 The first assessment provides a fairness judgment based on a verbal description of 
the mechanism, absent any experience of the task and the outcomes. Our second meas-
urement takes place immediately after the end of stage 1. Subjects have then completed 
four rounds of the real-effort task and received feedback on the number of correctly 
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placed sliders and the corresponding payoffs of both subjects in the dyad. Thus, we can 
observe whether and how experiencing the task and the resulting feedback affects sub-
jects’ fairness evaluations.  
 
2.3. Stage 2: Measurement of Social-Interaction Effects  
In the second stage, we use a trust game to measure the effects of the exogenous income 
variation on social interactions. In this game there are two player roles, the first mover 
(trustor) and the second mover (trustee). The first mover has an endowment of €6.00 
while the second mover has an endowment of €0.00. The first mover decides whether or 
not to transfer her endowment to the second mover. If she does not transfer, the game 
ends and the earnings will be €6.00 for the first mover and €0.00 for the second mover. In 
contrast, if she transfers her endowment, the experimenter triples the endowment such 
that the second mover receives €18.00 (and first mover has €0.00 now). The second mov-
er then decides how much of the €18.00 to send back to the first mover (by the cent). 
Payoffs follow directly from the second mover’s decision.   
 To obtain information on both decisions and the underlying processes, we use the 
strategy method. More precisely, we first elicit from each player in the dyad their deci-
sion as a first mover, and then their decision as a second mover conditional on having 
received a transfer (because otherwise there is no decision to be made). The player roles 
in the game are randomly determined after all decisions have been made and subjects are 
well aware of this fact. Therefore, this modification allows us to answer our first research 
question (i.e., the effect of inequality on trust in other individuals in a group; first mover) 
and the second research question (i.e., the greediness of individuals as a function of 
stage-1 income; second mover), within the same context. 
 We also measure participants’ beliefs regarding the behavior of the other player in 
this stage. Specifically, we ask subjects to indicate whether they believe the other player 
in the dyad transferred her endowment when acting as a first mover (yes/no), and to indi-
cate how much they think the other player sends back when acting as second mover (in 
six ranges: €0 to €3.00; €3.01 to €6.00; …; €15.01 to €18.00). We do not incentivize be-
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liefs because the preclusion of hedging opportunities would have required rather complex 
randomizations. Given the randomization in the implementation of the strategy method 
we did not want to complicate matters further.  
 We implemented two variations of the trust game stage. In condition Piece Rate and 
Tournament, stage-1 dyads remain intact and proceed together to stage 2. We emphasized 
at the very beginning of the experiment that subjects will interact with the same partner 
throughout the whole experiment. At the start of stage 2, subjects are reminded of this 
fact. They also receive a reminder of their own and the other person’s stage-1 earnings 
before making any choices in the trust game. In contrast, in condition Tournament-New 
the dyads are re-matched in stage 2, such that each person will play with a person with 
whom she did not interact in stage 1. Again, we made clear at the beginning of the exper-
iment that they interact with different, randomly determined subjects in the two stages. At 
the beginning of stage 2, they were informed about the new match and they received in-
formation on their own and the other persons’ (the new partner in the dyad) earnings 
from stage 1. This design precludes attributions of responsibility for each other’s stage-1 
outcomes. Moreover, as only earnings (but not effort) are communicated, is it not possi-
ble to attribute high or low stage-1 earnings to luck or effort.  
 
2.4. Procedural details and variable definitions 
In total, 636 subjects took part in the experiment that was programmed using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007): 160 in condition Piece Rate, 134 in condition Tournament, and 342 
in condition Tournament-New. While we conducted Piece Rate and Tournament in paral-
lel, we added Tournament-New after completing the other conditions to scrutinize the 
generality of the results. The first two conditions were run on a subject pool at the Uni-
versities in Heidelberg and Mannheim (balanced across conditions). For condition Tour-
nament-New we used the same subject pool and recruited 202 new subjects. In addition 
we ran sessions at the laboratory at the Technical University Berlin with a total of 140 
subjects to increase power, given the larger number of subgroups in matching stage-1 
winners and losers. Participants were undergraduate students from a wide range of differ-
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ent majors, who were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) in Berlin and Mannheim 
and with Hroot (Bock, Nicklisch, and Baetge, 2012) in Heidelberg.  
 Final payoffs were determined by adding payoffs from both the real-effort stage and 
the trust game. A typical session lasted about 50 minutes, and subjects earned, on average 
about €13.40 (approximately $14.70 at that time), with final payoffs ranging from €1.20 
to €30. There was no show-up fee in addition to the incentivized payoffs; that is, incen-
tives were very salient. 
 At the beginning of a session we matched participants in equal-gender dyads, with 
one mixed dyad if there was an uneven number of (fe)males. This was done based on the 
information about each subjects’ gender from the initial questionnaire. The matching pro-
cedure was anonymous and in particular subjects were not aware of the exact matching 
procedure. We implemented this matching procedure to control for possible gender dif-
ferences in the performance in the multiple-round slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2014) and 
in the behavior in the trust game (Bellemare and Kröger, 2007).  
 In the presentation of the results we use the following conventions. In the fixed dy-
ads conditions Piece Rate and Tournament we will call the person with the higher income 
in a dyad “successful” and the person with the lower income “unsuccessful.” In the Tour-
nament-New condition, participants encounter new partners, leading to various matches 
based on the stage-1 income. In the presentation, we denote subjects as “successful” if 
stage 1 income equals €12.00 and as “unsuccessful” if stage-1 income equals €1.20. This 
definition reflects the typical payoff pattern for the successful and unsuccessful in condi-
tion Tournament (results are robust to alternative definitions). In our analysis using the 
successful-unsuccessful denomination, we drop observations with equal income (in Piece 
Rate and Tournament, N=12) and unclassified subjects with an income between €12.00 
and €1.20 (in Tournament-New, N=54). 
 
3. Results: Income Inequality Manipulation 
We first provide evidence on effort levels, i.e., the number of correctly positioned sliders, 
in the different conditions. The Piece Rate and Tournament conditions did not result in 
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different levels of effort with an average number of correctly solved sliders of 75 in Piece 
Rate and 76 in Tournament in all four rounds (p=0.795, two-sided t-test). Effort in Tour-
nament-New was somewhat higher at 81 compared to Tournament (t=2.28, p=0.023). 
Importantly, the average difference in effort levels between the two players in a dyad in 
the first slider task does not differ in all three conditions (3.93 in Piece Rate, 4.33 in 
Tournament, and 4.54 in Tournament-New, two-sided t-tests, all p>0.28).  
Table 1: Stage-1 Earnings 
 Piece Rate Tournament Tournament-New  
Earnings: mean 5.77 6.60 6.60 
Earnings: median 5.75 6.60 6.60 
Earnings: 10% percentile 4.93 1.20 1.20 
Earnings: 90% percentile 6.70 12.00 12.00 
Notes: Entries are in €. 
  
Table 1 displays stage-1 earnings and shows that the tournament condition has the in-
tended effect on inequality. While average earnings are comparable across the different 
treatments, the variation in earnings is much larger in Tournament and Tournament-New 
than in Piece Rate. That is, small initial differences in effort translate into vast income 
inequality in Tournament and Tournament-New, but not in Piece Rate.  
 It is conceivable that subjects perceive the high reward for the tournament winner as 
justified, taking a meritocratic perspective and focus on incentives for performance (see 
e.g., Cappelen et al., 2007).  This is not what happens in the current context. Table 2 
shows that participants perceive the tournament mechanism as substantially less fair than 
the piece-rate mechanism. We observe strong treatment differences both before and after 
the experience of the task and for both the successful and the unsuccessful: the piece-rate 
scheme always receives much higher fairness evaluations than the two tournament 
schemes. Experiencing the task leads to lower evaluations compared to the mere verbal 
description for all three conditions. In all three conditions, the unsuccessful perceive the 
task as less fair than the successful. 
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 We conclude that the stage-1 manipulation succeeded in inducing strong differences 
in income inequality and fairness perceptions across piece rate and tournament condi-
tions. Moreover, successful and unsuccessful subjects strongly differ in their fairness 
perceptions, reflecting a self-serving bias that might have lead the successful to perceive 
the procedures and resulting positional differences as more justifiable than the unsuccess-
ful.       
Table 2: Fairness Evaluation of Payment Mechanism 
Point of 
evaluation 
Evaluators Piece Rate Tournament Tournament-New  
Before expe-
rience All 7.17 (n=160) 3.69
*** (n=134) 3.91*** (n=342) 
After experi-
ence All 6.78
^^^ (n=160) 2.44^^^,*** (n=134) 2.90^^^ ,*** (n=342) 
After experi-
ence 
Successful 7.32 (n=78) 2.98*** (n=63) 3.57*** (n=144) 
Unsuccessful 6.36## (n=78) 1.92##,*** (n=63) 2.00###,*** (n=144) 
Notes: Entries are fairness ratings ranging from 0 (perceived as very unfair) to 10 (perceived as very fair);   
*,**,*** indicates significant difference between Piece Rate and Tournament conditions; #,##,### indi-
cates significant difference between successful and unsuccessful; and ^,^^,^^^ indicates significant differ-
ence between evaluation before and after experience; at the 10%, 5%,1% level, t-test; pairs with equal earn-
ings excluded in analyses of successful and unsuccessful.  
 
4. Results: Social Interaction Effects for Fixed Dyads  
4.1. Main Effects 
We now turn to the analysis of whether the strong differences in payoff inequality and 
fairness perception between Piece Rate and Tournament affect behavior in the stage-2 
trust game. Figure 1 and Table 3 show our main results. We observe strong treatment 
effects, with the share of trusting participants (i.e., transferring their endowment to the 
second mover) being almost 20 percentage points lower in Tournament than in Piece rate 
(top panel, Table 3). Trust is significantly lower in Tournament for both the successful 
and the unsuccessful. However, we do not detect significant differences in trust between 
these subgroups in either treatment.   
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Result 1: Unjust inequality in stage 1 is detrimental for social trust in stage-2 interaction 
for fixed dyads.  
  
Figure 1: Trust and returns in Piece Rate and Tournament 
 
 
Table 3: Social Interaction Effects of Payment Mechanism 
 Participants Piece Rate Tournament 
Trusting  All 71%  (n=160) 53%***  (n=134) 
 Successful 71%  (n=78) 49%***  (n=63) 
 Unsuccessful 71%  (n=78) 56%*  (n=63) 
Amount returned All €6.41  (n=154) €5.50**  (n=134) 
 Successful €6.30  (n=78) €6.10  (n=63) 
 Unsuccessful €6.55  (n=78) €4.65##,*** (n=63) 
Notes: *,**,*** indicates significant difference between treatment; #,##,### indicates significant differ-
ence between successful and unsuccessful; at the 10%, 5%,1% level, two-sided t-test for amounts re-
turned, test of proportion for trust; pairs with equal earnings excluded in analyses of successful and 
unsuccessful. 
 
 The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the amounts returned by the second mover. Re-
member that there are no strategic considerations at this stage and that these amounts are 
conditional on the trust decision of the first mover resulting in a budget of €18 for the 
second mover and €0 for the first-mover. We observe that amounts returned are almost 
€1 lower in the Tournament than in the Piece Rate condition (6.4 vs 5.5). Thus, transfer-
ring the budget implies an expected loss for the first mover in Tournament. This effect is 
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mainly driven by the behavior of the unsuccessful stage-1 subjects. While there is no dif-
ference in the amounts returned across conditions for the successful, the stage-1 losers 
strongly reduce these amounts in Tournament. Consequently, amounts returned are sig-
nificantly lower for the unsuccessful than for the successful in Tournament.  
 Despite the higher amounts returned in Tournament by the successful, we may argue 
that they still fall strongly short of relevant normative benchmarks. First, they give less 
than the unsuccessful relative to their wealth. Second, in spite of having typically earned 
€12 in stage 1 (vs. €1.20 for their partner), they are far from sharing the stage-2 income 
(return €9), or overall income (return €15.60) equally. However, failure to meet such 
normative criteria is not restricted to the successful. In Piece Rate, stage-1 payoff differ-
ences are modest in most dyads, and both the successful and the unsuccessful fail to share 
their income equally (return €9). It seems that in general, stage-1 income is not taken into 
consideration when deciding about how much to return to the trustor. The observer’s 
higher normative expectations towards the stage-1 winners make this behavior look less 
acceptable for the successful in Tournament.  
Result 2: Unjust inequality in stage 1 is detrimental for generosity in stage-2 interaction 
for fixed dyads. 
Result 3: In the low-inequality environment (Piece Rate) both the winners and the losers 
are equally generous; in the high-inequality environment (Tournament) the winners are 
more generous in absolute terms, and less generous relative to their wealth. 
 While reduced trustworthiness (generosity) affects the distribution of trust game 
earnings resulting in a higher variance and skewness, reduced trust affects overall welfare 
because of the inefficiency of forgoing the tripled payoffs after transfer. Indeed, we ob-
serve that the welfare effects are substantial. Expected trust game earnings are €1.08 low-
er in the Tournament condition (€7.26 vs. €6.18), a 15% loss compared to the Piece Rate 
condition.  
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4.1. Underlying Mechanism  
The previous analysis has illustrated that there are substantial differences in trust and 
trustworthiness in the fixed-dyad design of the Tournament vs. Piece Rate condition. Our 
controlled laboratory context allows us to shed more light on the underlying mechanisms 
of this effect. We discuss the role of beliefs, the effect of pure inequality (not necessarily 
perceived as unjust), and the case of random losses in dyads with equal performance in 
Tournament.   
Beliefs. In stage 2 we measured subjects’ beliefs regarding the other player’s behavior as 
a trustor and as a trustee in a dyad. In the Appendix (Table A.1), we show that the Tour-
nament condition induces more pessimistic beliefs regarding both trust and amounts re-
turned. These effects are significant for the whole sample, but only significant for the 
successful subgroup when differentiating by stage-1 outcome. That is, the stage-1 condi-
tion affects subjects’ beliefs. In tables 4 and 5 we investigate whether these beliefs can 
explain the treatment effects on trust and trustworthiness. The tables provide four specifi-
cations: Specifications 1 and 2 verify the raw comparisons discussed above including 
various controls. Specifications 3 and 4 include beliefs about trust and trustworthiness. 
 We find a clear correlation between beliefs and behavior. For trust, beliefs about the 
other person’s trust and her trustworthiness relate to higher trust. The latter effect makes 
sense from a strategic point of view (expecting lower returns on trust), while the former 
effect suggests a conditionally-cooperative or reciprocal view (conditioning on behavior 
if the other person were in the trustor’s position). Results on trustworthiness support the 
reciprocal view as well. Higher beliefs on amounts returned by the other player relate to 
higher amounts returned. Because strategic aspects are absent for the second mover, be-
liefs about the other person’s returns can only play a role in terms of reciprocal thinking. 
Note that while beliefs play a role for both trustor and trustee behavior, the main treat-
ment effects of the Tournament condition remain substantial when including the beliefs. 
That is, beliefs cannot fully explain the effect of unjust inequality on social interactions.     
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Table 4: Determinants of Trust 
Dependent variable: Transfer (yes/no) to second mover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tournament -.178 
(3.05)*** 
-.147  
(1.74)* 
-.133 
(2.06)** 
-.131  
(1.45) 
Successful  .010 
(.13) 
 .070 
(.81) 
Tournament × Successful  -.076 
(.63) 
 -.006 
(.05) 
Belief in trust by other   .428 
(6.64)*** 
.411 
(6.20)*** 
Belief in amount returned 
by other 
  .046 
(3.27)*** 
.047 
(3.33)*** 
Male -.082 
(1.42) 
-.097 
(1.61) 
-.059 
(.94) 
-.071 
(1.10) 
N 294 282 294 282 
Joint effect of tournament 
variable 
 χ=9.67, p<.01  χ=4.05, p=.132 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regressions with robust z-statistics in parenthesis. All regressions 
control for session size and location. Linear regressions support the sign of the interaction terms in the 
probit regressions. Belief in amount returned by other scaled to 100 cents.  
Table 5: Determinants of Amounts Returned 
Dependent variable: Amount returned in cents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tournament -101 
(1.9)* 
-198  
(2.70)*** 
-40 
(.85) 
-166  
(2.68)*** 
Successful  -8 
(.13) 
 17 
(.31) 
Tournament × Successful  167 
(1.53) 
 253 
(2.80)*** 
Belief in trust by other   13 
(.26) 
22 
(.44) 
Belief in amount returned 
by other 
  77 
(7.42)*** 
84 
(8.62)*** 
Male -215 
(4.05)*** 
-207 
(3.77)*** 
-170 
(3.63)*** 
-157 
(3.33)*** 
N 294 282 294 282 
Joint effect of tournament 
variable 
 F=3.70, p=.026  F=4.59, p=.011 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust t-statistics in parenthesis. All regressions control for session size 
and location. Linear regressions support the sign of the interaction terms in the tobit regressions. Belief 
in amount returned by other scaled to 100 cents. Amounts are coded in cents. 
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Pure inequality. While our design does not aim at disentangling the different aspects of 
unjust inequality and the subsequent erosion of trust and trustworthiness, we can use 
within-treatment variation in stage-1 earnings differences to obtain some insights into the 
effects of pure inequality, i.e., inequality that is not necessarily perceived as unjust. We 
define the earnings difference as the difference between a participant’s own and the part-
ner’s stage-1 earnings. We use the same specification as in the regressions in Tables 4 
and 5 and include the earnings difference, or alternatively its absolute value. We do this 
in the Piece Rate and Tournament conditions separately, and in the combined set of ob-
servations. Note that in the Piece Rate condition, we can study the effect of pure inequali-
ty absent the unjust and competitive allocation mode in Tournament. Although inequality 
is less severe than in Tournament, in Piece Rate there were still 78 dyads with a nonzero 
earnings difference, ranging from €0.05 to €4.10. 
Table 6: Effect of Pure Inequality 
 Piece Rate Tournament All 
Trust    
Earnings difference  .01       (.31) -.003      (.78) -.003        (.75) 
Earnings difference (absolute 
value)  
.1       (2.11)** -.013      (.82) -.017        (2.83)*** 
Amounts returned    
Earnings difference -5           (.19) 8           (1.79)* 7             (1.76)* 
Earnings difference (absolute 
value) 
39          (.91) -14        (1.19) -12          (2.09)** 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient from a separate regression. Marginal effects from probit regres-
sions for Trust with robust z-stats in parenthesis. Tobit regressions for Amounts Returned with robust t-
stats in parenthesis. Amounts are in cents and Earnings and Earnings differences are scaled to 100 cents. 
All regressions control for session size, location and gender. *,**,*** indicates significant difference 
from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
 
 Table 6 shows the coefficients for the earnings difference variables (each entry refers 
to one separate regression). We do not find evidence of any negative effects of inequality 
on stage-2 behavior within either the Piece Rate or the Tournament conditions. When 
combining the observations from the two treatments, the absolute value of the earnings 
difference becomes significant and negative for both trust and amounts returned, captur-
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ing the treatment effects between Piece Rate and Tournament. In sum, there is no evi-
dence that pure inequality is driving the observed negative social-interaction effects.     
Equality of outcome versus equality of opportunity. In the Tournament condition, 8 dyads 
ended up with an equal performance in the first round of the slider task. In this case, a 
random draw determined the player who received the high payoff and the time bonus (vs. 
low payoff and time penalty). Comparing random winners and losers, we find that ran-
dom winners tend to trust less but return more money, albeit the differences are insignifi-
cant possibly due to low number of observations. Controlling for a random loss or win in 
the regressions in tables 4 and 5 by including a dummy for bad and good luck, we find 
that all results are qualitatively unaffected. There are no significant effects for random 
winners and losers compared to other successful and unsuccessful. That is, the treatment 
effects are not merely driven by a potential perception of the random draw (equality of 
opportunity) being unfair compared to, for example, an equal split of the payment (equal-
ity of outcome).   
 
5. Results: Social-Interaction Effects in New Dyads 
The comparison between Piece Rate and Tournament has revealed strong detrimental 
effects on social interactions. In this section, we test the boundaries of this effect by re-
matching subjects into new dyads in stage 2. While the experience and perception of 
competition and unjust inequality is identical to the Tournament condition (see Section 3 
results), a direct attribution of “responsibility” for the mutual stage-1 outcomes is absent 
in this condition. A negative attribution of high stage-1 earnings for the successful to un-
deserved luck also becomes more difficult as effort information on the stage-1 dyad is not 
available.7 The rematching of dyads allows us to distinguish between the role of a play-
                                                 
7 König-Kersting et al. (2017) find that outcome information biases the perception of the underlying pro-
cess (“outcome bias”). They find that the bias is mainly driven by positive random outcomes being falsely 
attributed to the decision maker’s skill. If this effect transfers to the current setting, we expect that good 
stage-1 outcomes should more likely be attributed to skill, rather than luck, by stage-2 players.    
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er’s own income and the income of the matched partner: this was impossible in Tourna-
ment because these incomes were perfectly correlated.  
 We first run simple probit/tobit regressions with treatment dummies (and controls) to 
compare average behavior over all groups in Tournament-New (trust = 65%; amount re-
turned = €6.61) to Piece Rate (trust = 71%; amount returned = €6.41) and Tournament 
(trust = 53%; amount returned = €5.50). The results show that Tournament-New does not 
differ significantly from Piece Rate, but leads to significantly larger trust and generosity 
than Tournament ( χ2 = 4.82, p=.028 and χ2 = 9.52, p=0.02).  
Table 7: Social Interaction Effects – Tournament-New 
 Participants vs. all vs. successful vs. unsuccessful 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Trusting  all 65% (n=342) 64% (n=144) 64% (n=144) 
 Successful  68% (n=144)  71% (n=56)  69% (n=67) 
 Unsuccessful 62% (n=144)  61% (n=67) 55% (n=56) 
Amount returned all €6.61 (n=342) €6.49 (n=144)  €6.51 (n=144)  
 Successful €7.37 (n=144)  €7.96 (n=56)   €6.98# (n=67)  
 Unsuccessful €5.74 (n=144)***  €5.48*** (n=67)  €5.52** (n=56)  
Notes: *,**,*** indicates significant difference between successful and unsuccessful; #,##,### indicates 
significant difference between successful partner and unsuccessful partner; at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, test 
of proportion for trust, and two-sided t-test for amounts returned. Unclassified participants (n=54, i.e., 
those with an income between €12.00 and €1.20) are excluded when conditioning on successful and unsuc-
cessful decision maker or successful and unsuccessful partner. This leads to different number of observa-
tions across cells, depending on stage-2 matches with unclassified subjects.   
 
 Next, Table 7 shows detailed results for Trust and for Amounts Returned, separately 
for successful and unsuccessful decision makers, and successful and unsuccessful part-
ners in the dyad. The upper panel of Table 7 shows trust behavior. There are no signifi-
cant raw differences in trust between the successful and the unsuccessful (column 1), and 
neither between situations interacting with a successful partner (column 2), and an unsuc-
cessful partner (column 3). However, there is a tendency to trust the stage-1 losers less 
and also for the losers to trust less. Accordingly, trust within dyads of unsuccessful par-
ticipants is lower than trust within dyads of successful participants (55% vs. 71%, z=1.77, 
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p=0.0775). Regressions reveal that winners are 12.4 percentage points more likely to trust 
others than losers, which is a significant effect (see Table 8).   
 The lower panel of Table 7 shows that stage-1 winners are significantly more gener-
ous as second movers than stage-1 losers are. This holds for interactions with other win-
ners and for interactions with losers. In fact, the successful in Tournament-New behave 
more generously on average than the successful under the Piece-rate condition (7.37 vs 
6.3, p=0.02, two-sided t-test). When matched with another stage-1 winner, winners give 
even more to the partners in the dyad than when matched with a stage-1 loser (€7.96 vs. 
€6.97). As in the case of trust, these effects lead to an overall large difference of gener-
osity within the group of unsuccessful people versus the group of successful people 
(€5.52 vs. €7.96, t=3.56, p<0.001).8  
 
Table 8: Determinants of Trust and Amounts Returned – Tournament-New 
 Trust Trust Amounts 
Returned 
Amounts 
Returned 
Successful .124 
(2.00)** 
.141  
(1.83)* 
234 
(4.18)*** 
160 
(3.53)*** 
Successful Partner .050   
(.79) 
-.062 
(.82) 
56 
(1.00) 
-35 
(.83) 
Belief in trust by other  .581 
(7.42)*** 
 122 
(2.08)** 
Belief in amount returned by other  .062 
(4.51)*** 
 76 
(6.08)*** 
Male -.127    
(2.00)** 
-.130 
(1.75)* 
-88 
(1.52) 
-82 
(1.79)* 
N 246 246 246 246 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regressions for Trust with robust z-statistics in parenthesis. 
Tobit regressions for Amounts Returned with robust t-stats in parenthesis. Amounts are coded in 
cents. All regressions control for session size and location. Belief in amount returned by other 
scaled to 100 cents. 
                                                 
8  We can compare behavior in mixed dyads of successful matched with unsuccessful in Tournament-New 
to the respective group in Tournament. We find that the successful are more trusting in Tournament-New 
than in Tournament (p=0.02) and equally trustworthy. The behavior of the unsuccessful does not differ 
significantly between Tournament and Tournament-New.    
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 The result that dyads of stage-1 losers subjects perform worst in terms of trust and 
trustworthiness suggests that the detrimental effect of inequality on trust and trustworthi-
ness is not driven by inequality within dyads per se. Moreover, because of the reduced 
trust and trustworthiness within the group of dyads of stage-1 losers, stage-2 inequality is 
larger, and stage-2 welfare is lower in this group compared to the winner dyads. The ex-
pected welfare loss of the loser dyads amounts to €0.96, a 13% loss compared to the win-
ner dyads. As in the case of trust, a regression analysis shows that the winners return sig-
nificantly higher amounts in the trust game (Table 8). 
Result 4: The detrimental effects of unjust inequality on social interactions are dampened 
in newly assembled dyads. Negative effects derive mainly from interactions among the 
unsuccessful. 
 A closer look at the participants’ beliefs explains the differences in trust game behav-
ior between Tournament and Tournament-New. Table 8 shows that the effect of beliefs 
on trust and amounts returned emerge in Tournament-New just as in Tournament. How-
ever, while in Tournament there were substantial negative effects of the stage-1 interac-
tion on beliefs, especially for the winning partners, there are no such negative effects in 
Tournament-New (see Appendix A.2). Moreover, in Tournament-New the successful 
stage-1 players hold more positive views than the unsuccessful ones, especially when 
paired with another successful person.  
 We also observe that social aspects must be relevant for the observed effects. That is, 
the negative effects for the unsuccessful stage-1 dyads cannot simply derive from higher 
risk aversion caused by their lower income. We observe negative effects for the loser in 
both trust (potentially affected by risk attitude) and the non-strategic behavior as second 
mover. Moreover, in the comparison between Piece Rate and Tournament, where unsuc-
cessful players were always matched with successful ones, there were no differences be-
tween the two groups. In contrast, recent literature suggests that, if relative position is 
salient, inequality may lead the poor to take higher levels of risk (see Payne et al., 2017, 
and references therein). We therefore interpret our results in terms of reduced levels of 
social capital within groups of unsuccessful subjects, rather than in terms of risk attitudes.  
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6. Discussion 
Our experiment investigates the potential negative effects of unjust economic inequality 
on social interactions and focuses, in particular, on the role of the economically success-
ful in harming the social fabric. Our finding that unjust inequality arising in a competitive 
environment has substantial effects on trust and trustworthiness supports the view that 
such an environment might be detrimental to social interactions, well-being, and more 
generally to social capital (Kawachi et al., 1997; Verhaeghe, 2014; Buser and Dreber, 
2016).9 Increased pessimism about others’ willingness to cooperate and thus a lower will-
ingness to take the social risk of trusting a stranger is also indicative for a decline in so-
cial capital. Indeed, we not only find that beliefs are correlated with behavior but also that 
they are significantly more pessimistic if inequality is unjust. As a consequence, a vicious 
cycle of decreasing trust and cooperation may result, leading to a substantial loss of so-
cial capital. 
 Importantly, we find that the decline in trust and trustworthiness is mostly driven by 
the less well-off. Thus, we find no evidence for the hypothesis that the behavior of the 
successful is mainly responsible for the erosion of the social fabric. This is consistent 
with recent findings of Camera et al. (2017). They report that the worse-off subjects dis-
criminate against better-offs by cooperating less with them in a repeated helping game, 
even when wealth is determined by chance, leading to an overall efficiency loss in the 
long run. Zheng (2017) similarly reports a higher degree of selfish behavior in a team 
production setting for low status subjects, where status is endowed in non-monetary 
terms (public praise). In Table A3 in the appendix, we summarize a larger set of experi-
mental studies that relate to the question of the impact of inequality and competition on 
cooperation and trust. Although these studies greatly differ in terms of design, the overall 
picture is consistent with negative social capital effects being more likely. However, the 
                                                 
9 Besides negative economic consequences, limited social interaction between the poor and rich may also 
increase the cultural gap between them. New evidence by Bertrand and Kamenica (2017) suggests that 
media consumption, consumer behavior, and time use of the rich and poor in the US have not diverged 
much since the 1960s despite the tremendous increase in income inequality, while social attitudes did di-
verge.  
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table shows a rather mixed picture about which social status group may drive the ob-
served effects. That is, differences in implementation of inequality may be important for 
the relevant channel driving social capital effects.        
 If the, arguably modest, degree of competition and unjust inequality in a lab setting 
can induce strong effects on social behavior, we may expect the consequences to be even 
more severe in more significant situations outside the lab. However, our results also hint 
to the boundaries of such effects. Negative effects on trust and trustworthiness are overall 
reduced if the interaction partner has not directly contributed to the existing income ine-
quality within a dyad. This happens despite the fact that subjects perceive the tournament 
as equally unfair in the two Tournament conditions. At a first glance, this result contra-
dicts results in Buser and Dreber (2016) who report negative effects of competition on 
cooperation even in newly assembled groups. In contrast to Buser and Dreber, however, 
subjects in our new-dyads condition were aware of their own and the other player’s in-
come situation. It seems likely that the apparent uncertainty about outcomes in Buser and 
Dreber induces a behavior closer to our condition of fixed dyads. Indeed, positive trust 
game effects emerge in the new-dyads condition especially in interactions between two 
stage-1 winners, i.e., in a situation with high income and income equality. If information 
about other’s income is absent, positive effects on trust (and trustworthiness) may not be 
easily realized. 
 The observed differences between the fixed dyads and the newly assembled dyads 
hint at the volatility of the subtle psychological effects caused by inequality or fairness 
cues. Moreover, our manipulation combined strong inequality with a competitive and 
perceived unjust payment scheme. We have argued that this key feature of our setup is 
relevant in many contexts outside the lab such as in educational systems, labor markets or 
one’s social environment (e.g., Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, 2016; 
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006; Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent, 2009). The more 
modest inequality emerging in condition Piece Rate is perceived as fair and allows play-
ers to maintain a high level of trust and trustworthiness. The perceived justice of the insti-
tution from which unequal outcomes derive thus seems to constitute an essential aspect. 
Our results lend support to Starmans et al. (2017), who argue that it is not inequality per 
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se that bothers people in life, but economic unfairness. Indeed, dyads of unsuccessful 
participants in Tournament-New score low on trust and trustworthiness despite having 
equal outcomes; their experience of disadvantages caused by unfair economic allocations 
seems to affect behavior, rather than inequality per se.  
 The finding of low social capital among the poor is consistent with field data on de-
prived neighborhoods in the UK. Compared to wealthy neighborhoods, social capital is 
lower in deprived neighborhoods, measured by interactions among people in the same 
neighborhood and thus social class (Nettle et al., 2011). Our results suggest that these 
field data may not simply caused by selection of people in or out of certain neighbor-
hoods. Nevertheless, selection and upbringing may be important in the field. For exam-
ple, in contrast with our and with Nettle et al.’s finding, Martinsson et al. (2015) report 
that Colombian university students from a wealthy university are less cooperative among 
each other than those at a lower social status university. The differences in upbringing 
and life experiences seem to have an opposite effect in this sample compared to Nettle et 
al.’s UK data.   
 A large literature in psychology has argued that rich, high-status individuals are less 
generous in absolute terms than poor, low-status individuals (e.g. Piff et al., 2010; 2012; 
Guinote et al., 2015). In particular, this literature makes the causal claim that increasing 
wealth induces less social behavior. In correlational field data, the existence of a negative 
correlation between status and prosocial behavior has been questioned (Trautmann et al., 
2013), and various studies have recently shown that wealthy individuals are often more 
prosocial and more generous in absolute terms (e.g. Andreoni et al., 2017; Smeets et al., 
2015), and also relative to their wealth position (Korndörfer et al., 2015). A negative 
causal effect of increased wealth and status on prosociality may still exist, dampening an 
otherwise positive correlation between wealth and prosocial behavior through a selection 
effect if the prosocial are economically more successful.  
 In contrast to the results found in the above cited psychological literature, in our ex-
periment the better-off stage-1 winners are always more generous than the worse-off in 
the second stage of the trust game. Arguably, stage-1 losers should thus be more trusting 
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than the winners, expecting higher returns from trust. Yet, this is not the case. Moreover, 
in the Tournament-New condition we observe that unsuccessful when matched with an-
other unsuccessful subject are less trusting and less trustworthy than the successful when 
matched with another successful. That is, overall welfare is reduced and a higher degree 
of inequality emerges within their group of stage-1 losers. These results suggest that neg-
ative effects of unjust inequality are driven by the behavior of the poor, rather than the 
behavior of the rich.  
 Some qualifications need to be made with respect to the last point. Despite their 
higher degree of generosity in absolute terms, the successful players still fall substantially 
short of obvious normative benchmarks for second movers, such as equal sharing of the 
stage-2 payoffs, or even equal sharing of total experimental payoffs; they give a lower 
share of their income compared to the poor. That is, while the successful are more proso-
cial, they fall short of the potential normative expectations we may hold with respect to 
their behavior (in contrast to the empirical expectations as measured in the experiment, 
which may turn out more consistent with actual behavior). This is not the case for the 
poor, for whom no such expectations exist in the current setup. The same is probably true 
in larger contexts outside the lab. Such an expectation-behavior gap for the rich may ex-
plain the appeal of picturing elites as immoral and selfish in popular discourses, which 
were eager to pick up the results by Piff et al. (2012) and others supporting the view of 
the selfish elite.  
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Appendix 
A.1. Instructions and Screen Shots 
An English translation of the original instructions can be found online at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/21c7unjcko336ck/Merged%20Instructions%20%28English
%29.pdf?dl=0  (to prevent the current document from becoming excessively large). The 
instructions also contain relevant screen shots with explanations. Here we present the 
screenshot of the real-effort task as referred to in the main text.     
 
 
 
Figure A1: Screen Shot: Slider Task (42 sliders per round) 
 
 
  
28 
 
A.2. Effects of Stage-1 Condition on Beliefs  
Tables A1 and A2 show beliefs in treatments Piece rate and Tournament, and Tourna-
ment-New, respectively. Treatment comparisons find no significant differences between 
Piece rate and Tournament-New beliefs about trust (63% vs. 59%, p=0.386) and about 
amounts returned (€5.85  vs. €5.74, p=0.676). 
 
Table A1: Effects of Stage-1 Condition on Trust Game Beliefs  
 Participants Piece rate Tournament 
Belief in trust by other all 63% (n=160) 50%** (n=134) 
successful 58% (n=75) 43%* (n=63) 
 unsuccessful 68% (n=75) 56% (n=63) 
Expected amount returned by 
other 
all €5.85 (n=160) €5.08** (n=134) 
successful €5.69 (n=78) €4.36*** (n=63) 
 unsuccessful €5.96 (n=78) €5.60## (n=63) 
Notes: *,**,*** indicates significant difference between treatment; #,##,### indicates significant difference 
between successful and unsuccessful; at the 10%, 5%,1% level, two-sided t-test for amounts returned, test 
of proportion for trust; pairs with equal earnings excluded in analyses of successful and unsuccessful.   
 
 
Table A2: Effects of Stage-1 Condition on Trust Game Beliefs – Tournament-New 
 Participants  vs. successful  vs. unsuccessful 
Belief in Trust by 
Other  
all 59% (n=342) 63% (n=144) 54% (n=144) 
successful 56% (n=144)  66% (n=56) 51%# (n=67) 
 unsuccessful 61% (n=144)  63% (n=67) 59% (n=56) 
Belief in Amount 
Returned by Other 
all €5.74 (n=342) €5.90 (n=144)  €5.35 (n=144)  
successful €6.04 (n=144)  €6.91 (n=56)   €5.40### (n=67)  
 unsuccessful €5.33 (n=144)**   €5.44***(n=67)  €4.93 (n=56)   
Notes: *,**,*** indicates significant difference between successful and unsuccessful; #,##,### indicates 
significant difference between successful and unsuccessful partner; at the 10%, 5%,1% level, two-sided t-
test for amounts returned, test of proportion for trust; number of unclassified participants differs in cells 
conditioning on successful vs. unsuccessful or successful vs. unsuccessful partner.   
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A.3. Experimental literature on inequality and competition 
Table A3 presents laboratory experiments that study questions regarding the effect of competition and inequality on social interaction. 
We concisely summarize the key study aspects and the social interaction effect. If there exist any such effects, we indicate whether 
they are driven by the behavior of the successful/rich or the unsuccessful/poor.  
Table A3: Overview of experimental studies 
 Treatments Stage 1 Stage 2 Social interaction effect 
Anderson et al. (2006) Public / private show up 
fee 
High / low show-up fees 
as inequality “priming” 
Trust game Private: Trust (−), driven by the 
successful; Public: Trust (=). 
Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) High skewed treatment Randomly endowed 
“earnings” to create ine-
quality 
Public goods game Contribution (+), driven by the 
unsuccessful. 
Brandts et al. (2009) Rivalry/non-rivalry treat-
ment 
Prisoner’s dilemma game 
(with a competitive setting 
in rivalry treatment) that 
creates inequality as 
“priming” 
The circle test (similar 
to a dictator game) 
“Generosity” towards others who 
they interacted before (−), driven 
by unsuccessful. 
Harbring (2010) Competition game  Inequality as “priming” 
via a competitive game. 
Trust game Trust (−), unclear who drives the 
results. 
Heap et al. (2013) High / low inequality Randomly endowed 
“earnings” to create ine-
quality. 
Trust game (standard 
trust game or a labor 
market setting) 
Trust and trustworthiness (−), 
driven by both the successful and 
the unsuccessful. 
Smith (2011) Inequality Randomly endowed 
“earnings” to create ine-
quality 
Trust game Trust and trustworthiness (=) be-
cause the successful trust less but 
return more, while the unsuccessful 
do the opposite.  
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Table A3: Overview of experimental studies (continued) 
 Treatments Stage 1  Stage 2 Social inter-action effect 
Greiner et al. (2012) High / low inequality Randomly endowed “earn-
ings” to create inequality 
Modified trust game (1st 
period only) 
Trust (−), driven by both 
Nishi et al. (2015) Visible/ non-visible wealth 
difference under three 
levels of inequality. 
Randomly endowed “earn-
ings” to create inequality 
Cooperation game Cooperation (−), driven by the 
successful when inequality is visi-
ble. Inequality itself is not sufficient 
to drive this result, visibility is the 
key driver. 
Buser and Dreber (2016) Feedback on slider task  Competitive sliders task 
tournament, as “priming” 
Public goods game Contribution (− ), driven by both 
but more so by the unsuccessful. 
Camera et al. (2017) Info on wealth and role vs. 
no info 
Helping game, payoffs  
as “earnings” to create 
inequality 
Helping game (cont’d) The act of helping others (−), driv-
en by both. 
Brandts and Riedl (2017) Direct, indirect, and no 
competition  
Competitive double-
auction market, payoffs as  
“earnings” to create ine-
quality. In the absence of 
competition, randomly 
endow subjects. 
Public goods game Contribution (+ ) when no direct 
competition in stage 1, driven by 
the successful. Contribution ( − ) 
with direct competition, driven by 
both.  
Falk (2017) High vs. low social status.  Relative status info re-
vealed, as “priming” of 
social status. 
Electric shocks to others 
for personal gain 
Incidence of shocking others is 
higher when high/low status group 
interact, driven by both. 
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Table A3: Overview of experimental studies (continued) 
 Treatments Stage 1  Stage 2 Social inter-action effect 
Friedrichsen (2017) Inequality Randomly endowed “earn-
ings” to create inequality. 
Consumers with differ-
ent initial wealth choose 
between socially respon-
sible product and a 
cheaper alternative. 
The unsuccessful choose the social-
ly responsible products significantly 
more than the successful; no base-
line available to compare overall 
effect due to inequality. 
Lotito et al. (2017) High vs. low inequality Competitive real-effort 
task (admin tasks), as ine-
quality  
“priming” 
Public goods game Contribution (−): partial info on 
income / performance. 
Contribution (+) if full info.  No 
competition effect, results driven by 
information about inequality. 
Zheng (2018) Baseline / random / true 
status 
Painting evaluation, as 
status “priming” 
Similar to a dictator 
game over losses  
Less selfish behavior (+), driven by 
the successful, those who earned 
their high status.  
Notes: In column Stage 1, “priming” indicates that stage-1 game payoffs either prime a winner/successful or loser/unsuccessful mindset and that they are not 
used as an endowment for the stage-2 game (i.e., payoffs in the two games are independent). “Earnings” indicate that the amount of money earned/randomly 
assigned to the subjects in the stage-1 game is used as the endowment of the stage-2 game. In column Social interaction effect, “(−)”, “(=)”, and “(+)” denotes a 
decrease, no effect, and increase of socially desirable interaction such as trust, cooperation, and contribution to public goods. Entries with n/a indicates not appli-
cable because no relevant information is available.  
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